Students of ethnic identity have recently begun to recognize the role of the state in causing identity shift. Constructivists, in particular, focus on the importance of state institutions and policies in creating new identities and transforming old ones. This article focuses on identity creation and change in Bashkortostan, an ethnic region within the Russian Federation. It shows how, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Russian/Soviet state created new ethnic identities from pre-existing regional, estate-based and religious identities. It also shows how later changes in state institutions and policies played a crucial role in determining the direction of identity change among a mixed population, straddling the geographical and cultural boundaries between the Tatar and Bashkir ethnic groups. By tracing the impact of the state on one ethnic group over an extended time-period, this article shows that state actions can lead to both instrumental and culturally-ba sed shifts in ethnic identity.
In recent years scholarship on the formation and maintenance of ethnic identity has largely focused on the debate over whether students of ethnicity should focus their attention on the effects of cultural boundary maintenance between neighbouring groups (Barth 1969; or on cultural development among an ethnic group's core members (Roosens 1994) . In some ways this is an outgrowth of the earlier debate between situationalists, who assert that ethnicity is exible and is often used for economic and political gain, and primordialists, who argue that ethnicity is a permanent and essential aspect of one's identity. 1 Barth and his followers argue that ethnic identity is 'a feature of social organization, rather than a nebulous expression of culture. . . . This means focusing on the boundary and the processes of recruitment, not on the cultural stuff the boundary encloses' (Barth 1994, p. 12). Roosens (1994, p. 84), by contrast, argues that ethnic identity cannot exist without some cultural or genealogical substance, which provides an internal source of identi cation for the groups' members that is at least as important as the external source of identi cation provided by group boundaries.
Scholars who study ethnic identity change have attempted to surmount this debate by synthesizing the two approaches. Charles Keyes (1981) , for example, begins with the cultural core of ethnic identity, but argues that a complete analysis of ethnic change must incorporate factors such as social structure and inter-group interaction. Judith Nagata (1981) explicitly argues for combining primordialist and situationalist approaches. Studies of ethnic change based on this synthetic perspective argue that the way members of an ethnic group conceive of their identity may change as the result of interactions between neighbouring ethnic groups, but that newly modi ed identities will remain anchored by a cultural core which is based on the members' self-perception. Keyes argues that primordial identity serves as a gyroscope for individuals facing radical changes in their political and economic environment. Individuals may change their identities as a consequence of migration, changes in state boundaries, the establishment of new government programmes, and revolutionary change in the structure of society (1981, pp. 27-28) . In an introduction to a collection of articles on identity and change in Central Asia, Jo-Ann Gross (1992) provides a similar list of factors that may lead to shifts in ethnic identity, including changes in economic and political conditions in a region, cultural differences between neighbouring groups, changes in the interpretation of a group's shared experiences, the emergence of nationalist ideology, and changes in power relations between groups.
The sources of ethnic change described by these scholars focus on the actions of group members, who change their identity to correspond with various kinds of changes in their environment. Such a view plays down the ability of outside forces to deliberately shape ethnic identity. In this article I argue that such outsiders, particularly states that are not controlled by any of the local ethnic groups, can create changes in ethnic identity among the populations living in areas under their control. State institutions such as the census and administrative boundaries, as well as state policies such as preferential treatment for members of certain groups, often lead to the formation of new ethnic groups and to changes in the cultural content of existing ethnic identities. This point of view, often labelled constructivism, has been articulated by Leroy Vail (1989) and his collaborators in ascribing the creation of tribalism in Southern Africa largely to European colonial rule. They argue that the Europeans created ethnic divisions between cultural groups in order to make ruling their colonies easier. I show how similar processes were at work in the development of contemporary ethnic identities among the Tatars and Bashkirs, two Turkic Muslim minorities inhabiting the Volga-Ural region of Russia.
This change of focus is particularly important for students of ethnicity in the territory that formerly comprised the Soviet Union. Until the 1990s Soviet scholars were the strongest remaining proponents of a primordialist view of ethnicity. Ethnos theory, as championed by Yulian Bromley and his colleagues at the Institute of Ethnography of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, argued that all ethnic groups have a stable core, called ethnos, that persists across time and space, despite all changes in a group's political and economic circumstances (Bromley 1981) . Needless to say, such a point of view does not allow for the possibility that a particular ethnic identity may be a construct created and spread by the state. According to the ethnos theorists, Soviet nationalities policy simply catalogued existing ethnic groups, allowing them to receive, usually for the rst time, political and cultural institutions such as literary languages , native language school systems, and self-governing territorial units. Although a few Russian anthropologists have recently begun to move towards the constructivist argument (see Tishkov 1997), the primordialist view of ethnicity continues to predominate among scholars in the region. However, the evidence strongly disputes their claims that ethnic identities in the former Soviet region have remained relatively unchanged for many centuries. Tishkov (1997, pp. 15-21), for example, describes how deliberate ethnic engineering for political purposes on the part of Soviet authorities created new ethnic identities by combining or dividing previously existing ethnic groups. In this article, I go one step further by using census data to show how particular government policies led to changes in ethnic identi cation at the district and village levels.
Before moving on to the case-study, it is necessary to distinguish between two types of ethnic identi cation. Although the state is the most important actor in the creation of new ethnic labels, it is left to the potential members of the newly established or transformed ethnic group to accept or reject their new 'identity'. In cases where rejection of the statesponsored labels may lead to negative consequences or hinder the acquisition of bene ts, affected individuals sometimes adopt the new ethnonym as their public ethnic identity, while continuing to identify along traditional lines in the private sphere. Roosens (1994, p. 88) notes how migrants to Belgium from Catalunya assume 'Spanish' as their public identity when interacting with Belgians or the state, while retaining 'Catalan' as their identity when interacting among themselves and with migrants from other regions of Spain. Following Roosens, I distinguish between public ethnic identity, which refers to the identity used by members of a group in interactions with outsiders or with the government, and private ethnic identity, which refers to the identity on which interactions within the group and with neighbouring groups are based. As shown in this essay, private and public ethnic identities are not always congruent. Changes of ethnic identity may also be either public or private. Public identity change usually occurs when members of a group accept newly created or changed of cial designations for use when interacting with outsiders without adopting them for use within the group. Private identity change occurs when members of a group change their self-designation and adjust their social interactions with others to correspond with the new identity.
The case described in this article shows how state policies and institutions create the conditions for changes in ethnic identity. The state is shown to play a key role in both boundary shifts and changes in the cultural cores of ethnic identity, creating conditions that lead to changes in both public and private ethnic identity.
Ethnic re-identi cation in Bashkortostan: 1897-1989
Bashkortostan is a republic in the Volga-Ural region of the Russian Federation. It is one of the largest and wealthiest ethnic republics of Russia, with a territory of 143,000 sq km and a population of over four million. It is unusual among Russia's ethnic republics in that the titular ethnic group, the Bashkirs, is only the third largest group, less numerous than both Russians and Tatars. Furthermore, the relative percentages of Bashkirs and Tatars have varied signi cantly over the course of the last century. Figure 1 shows two periods of signi cant change in the proportions of Tatar and Bashkir ethnic groups in the total population. During the rst period, which lasted from 1897 until 1939, the percentage of the population which identi ed itself as Bashkir fell by one-half, while the absolute number of Bashkirs declined by a quarter. The Tatar population more than tripled in number, increasing its proportion of the population from 11 to 25 per cent.
2 A period of relative stability followed, but then, during the 1979-1989 intercensal period, the Bashkir population fell by 70,000 while the Tatar population rose by 180,000. Yet local ethnographers have shown that none of the usual sources of such uctuation, such
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Figure 1. Ethnic distribution in Bashkortostan
as migration or differences in rates of population growth, was present. Instead, many Bashkirs re-identi ed as Tatars during both periods. Why was ethnic re-identi cation so frequent among Bashkirs in the rst half of the twentieth century and again in the 1980s? 3 This topic has political implications that go beyond the scholarly debates outlined in the introduction to this article. Bashkir cultural and political leaders have long blamed the relative decline of the Bashkir population as compared to the Tatar population on assimilation through Tatar cultural imperialism. Political tensions over this pattern of reidenti cation existed throughout the twentieth century and, as I show below, in uenced the cultural and census policies of the Bashkortostan government from the 1920s to the 1980s. However, the political liberalization of the Gorbachev and post-Soviet periods brought these tensions into public discourse for the rst time, leading to con icts between Bashkir and Tatar cultural élites. Debate on the causes of identity shifts in northwest Bashkortostan has in recent years become closely tied to the debate on the status of Tatars and the Tatar language within the republic and therefore highly politicized. This environment has made scholarly study of the topic by local scholars very dif cult. In analysing the factors leading to changes in ethnic identities in this region, I hope to provide an outsider's point of view that is not biased by the political dimensions of this question.
In order to explain the factors behind Bashkir/Tatar identity shift, it is important to consider the speci c area where most of this re-identication took place. District-level ethnic breakdowns show that ethnic identity was relatively stable in most of Bashkortostan throughout the twentieth century (see Appendix 1). Almost all of the shifts in ethnic identity were limited to northwestern Bashkortostan, indicating that identity changes were even more pronounced in this area than aggregat e census data for the entire republic would suggest. Since this area borders Tatarstan, it is not surprising that it is home to most of the republic's Tatars (see Figure 2) . It is also populated by many Bashkirs who consider Tatar their native language. This group was rst noted in the 1926 Census, the rst census to separate ethnic identi cation and native language into distinct categories. The number and percentage of Tatarspeaking Bashkirs among the total Bashkir population has been steadily declining since that time (see Table 1 ). This sets up the second puzzle this article will need to explain: considering the strong connection between language and ethnic self-identi cation in communist ideology, how did a Tatar-speaking Bashkir group form? How did members of the group resolve the contradiction between these two ethnic identity markers, retaining their identity as Tatar-speaking Bashkirs over several decades? And what happened to them when they did change their identity? Did they re-identify as Tatars or did they switch their linguistic identi cation to correspond with their ethnic identi cation? Finally, how does this process interact with the general demographic trend towards Tatarization described above?
First period: 1897-1939 4 During the nineteenth century, the territory that is now northwestern Bashkortostan was the northwestern region of the Ufa province consisted of the Belebey, Birsk and Menzelinsk districts [uezdy] . Ufa province also included several districts to the south and east where ethnic identity remained relatively stable. After the revolution, the administrative division of this territory was radically altered by the creation of the autonomous ethnic republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Ufa province was divided between the two republics in 1922. Most of the province, including Belebey and Birsk districts, became a part of Bashkortostan, while Menzelinsk district was annexed by Tatarstan. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, northwestern Ufa province attracted large numbers of Tatar-speaking migrants. During this period, the Tatar ethnonym had not yet been universally adopted by Tatarspeaking Turks in the area. All Muslims living in the Volga-Ural region still shared a common identity based on their religion and a myth of descent from the Bulgar state of the tenth to thirteenth century (Frank 1998). Only gradually did the people who identi ed with this common identity come to refer to themselves as Tatars. Furthermore, while sharing this common regional identity, the migrants were divided into two groups based on their land of origin. The two groups were called Kazanly (people from Kazan) and Mishars. 5 There were two other groups already established in northwestern Ufa province: the Bashkirs and the Teptiars. These were considered both ethnic groups and estates [soslovie], stemming from a sixteenth-c entury royal decree giving Bashkirs special land-owning privileges on their territory. 6 Teptiars were also declared a land-owning estate, although they were entitled to a smaller portion of land and therefore had less prestige than the Bashkir estate. While the Bashkir estate as a whole was dominated by members of the Bashkir ethnic group, the Teptiar estate included members of most ethnic groups in the Volga region, including non-Turkic groups such as the Mari and Udmurts (Yakupov 1992, p. 168) . Ethnic minorities who were not members of the Bashkir or Teptiar estates could not own land and were required to rent it from members of one of the estates. During the late nineteenth century, the land-ownership system was reformed, of cially eliminating the estate system and placing members of all ethnic groups on an equal footing. On the ground, however, the last vestiges of this system did not disappear until the 1917 revolution . 7 Ethnic identity in northwestern Ufa province was highly unstable throughout this period. has compiled a database which includes information on the dominant ethnicity in all villages in northwestern Ufa province/Bashkortostan at various times from 1870 to 1989. This database shows that the dominant ethnicity in 47 per cent of all villages changed between 1870 and 1913. These changes included not only switches from Mishar, Teptiar and Tatar to Bashkir, but also from Bashkir to the other groups (see Table 2 ).
After 1917 ethnic identity changed again. The census administration gradually eliminated the Teptiar and Mishar categories, asking members of these categories to choose among ethnic labels recognized by the Soviet government. For Muslim Turkic-speakers, this allowed a choice between Tatar and Bashkir. Korostelev shows that approximately twothirds of Mishars and Teptiars identi ed themselves as Tatars, while onethird identi ed as Bashkirs. In addition, during the 1920s many Bashkirs re-identi ed as Tatars (1994, pp. 77 and 91).
The distinction between ethnic identi cation and native language, rst made in the 1926 Census, allows us to see two distinct patterns in Bashkir identity change. In those parts of Ufa province which were joined to Tatarstan after the revolution, the number of Bashkirs declined from 123,000 in 1897 to none in 1926 (Table 3) . Bashkirs who found themselves living in Tatarstan re-identi ed as Tatars. In areas which became part of Bashkortostan, some Bashkirs re-identi ed as Tatar, but many retained their Bashkir identi cation in the 1926 Census. Bashkirs who re-identied as Tatar primarily consisted of individuals who had adopted the Bashkir self-designation recently, previously calling themselves Mishar or Teptiar. Bashkirs who maintained their identity were concentrated in those villages which were considered Bashkir prior to the 1865 land reform (Rodnov 1995, p. 76) . However, in the northwest, almost all of these Bashkirs declared Tatar to be their native language. Whereas 89 per cent of the Turkic population in this area declared Bashkir to be their native language in 1897, 94 per cent declared Tatar to be their native language in 1926 (Korostelev 1994, p. 80) . Among Bashkirs, Tatar-speakers made up 46 per cent of the total population in 1926, including 89 per cent of northwestern Bashkirs. 8 The period between 1926 and 1939 witnessed a continuation of the previous pattern with a gradual tendency towards stabilization. The Tatar percentage of the population continued to increase at the expense of the Bashkirs, but at a slower rate than before (see Table 4 ). Most Bashkirs in the northwest maintained their ethnic identity while at the same time retaining Tatar as their native language .
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Causes of ethnic re-identi cation: 1897-1939
As shown above, ethnic identity was highly unstable during this period. This instability was caused primarily by changes in state policies towards non-Russian minorities and by the establishment of new ethnic institutions in the aftermath of the 1917 revolution. The tsarist system of population classi cation based on estates encouraged most local non-Russians to identify as Bashkirs in the 1897 Census. The gradual elimination of estate-based privileges, combined with the establishment of ethnic administrative units by the new communist government, encouraged many local inhabitants to switch to Tatar identi cation during the 1910s and 1920s. As a result of government decisions in creating a Bashkir literary language, a sizeable number of those inhabitants who retained their Bashkir identity declared Tatar to be their native language . Estate-based privileges. At the end of the nineteenth century, ethnic identity for local inhabitants was closely connected to their estate, which determined their place in the local socio-economic hierarchy. In this hierarchy, Bashkirs occupied the top rung, followed in order by Teptiars and Mishars, with everyone else at the lowest level. Bashkirs were the only group allowed to own land until 1865, when land reform gave some landownership rights to Teptiars and Mishars. The 1865 reform also made it signi cantly easier for individuals to change their estate status. After 1865, Teptiars and Mishars who changed status became New Bashkirs [NovoBashkiry ], while those who continued to rent land from Bashkirs retained their old label. Increasingly in the 1890s, members of the lowest level of the estate hierarchy, consisting mostly of former crown serfs, became known as Tatars (Rodnov 1995 , pp. 64-6 and 77).
It seems likely, therefore, that the number of Bashkirs according to the 1897 Census has little to do with the number of people who considered themselves culturally Bashkir or who spoke the Bashkir language , 9 which were found largely in areas to the south and east of Belebey and Birsk. Many of the people who identi ed as Bashkirs in the 1897 Census considered themselves members of the Bashkir estate while sharing the culture and dialect common to all groups in the area. The predominance of Bashkirs was due to the economic desirability and prestige of the Bashkir label and the 1865 institutional reforms which made re-identication possible for many Mishars and Teptiars. This explains the rapid growth in the number of Bashkirs in the west as compared to the east, where a distinct Bashkir culture and language did exist and which had never experienced an in ux of migrants 10 (see Table 5 ). The 1917 revolution changed the economic and political environment for the inhabitants of northwest Bashkortostan. All estate-based privileges, which had been in decline since the 1890s, were revoked by the communist government, giving all inhabitants the same rights to own land. (Collectivization would not take place until the 1930s.) Furthermore, the political administration of the region underwent a decisive transformation with the creation of autonomous ethnic republics for the Tatar and Bashkir ethnic groups. In 1922 the Ufa province was divided between Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, with Menzelinsk canton joining the former while the rest of the province became part of the latter. These changes together had a decisive impact on ethnic identi cation. Census data can help to separate the political and the economic factors causing ethnic re-identi cation. The 1913 rural Census shows the effect that the decline of estate privileges was having on ethnic identi cation. The proportion of Bashkirs in Ufa province fell from 41 per cent in 1897 to 32 per cent in 1913. The 1920 Census, conducted after the revocation of estate privileges but before the consolidation of the ethnic republics, shows a slight further decline, to 30 per cent 11 (Yuldashbaev 1995, Tables  5 and 56 ). Altogether , the end of estate privileges led to an 11 per cent decline in the relative proportion of Bashkirs in Ufa province. This decline was primarily caused by the return of New Bashkirs to their previous Mishar and Teptiar identities. Mishars increased from one per cent to 6 per cent of the total population between 1897 and 1920, while Teptiars increased from 1.8 per cent to 5.3 per cent. Tatar identi cation also rose, but to a much lesser extent, from 8.4 per cent to 9.7 per cent. Altogether, the three groups' proportion of the total population increased by 10 per cent. The remaining one per cent decline can be attributed to Russian migration into the region (Khismatullin 1992; Yuldashbaev 1995, Table 5 ). 12 Starting with the 1920s, Soviet nationalities policy called for privileges for members of the titular ethnic group in ethnic republics. These privileges included control of republic administration, preferences in hiring, promotion and acceptance by universities, and priority in cultural development funding. These privileges made it advantageous for individuals to identify as members of the titular ethnic group. For members of most ethnic groups, changing one's identity to the titular ethnicity was impossible because linguistic and cultural differences between groups made it relatively easy to detect 'inauthentic' titulars. However, for groups as closely related as Tatars and Bashkirs, detection was quite dif cult, making such a choice not only possible, but even quite easy to accomplish.
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The division of Ufa province between Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in 1922 allows us to study the effect of belonging to an ethnic republic on identity choice. In this division, Menzelinsk canton became a part of Tatarstan, while the rest of Ufa province, including neighbourin g Birsk and Belebey cantons, joined Bashkortostan. Table 6 shows the sharp fall in the Bashkir population in the region as a whole between 1897 and 1926. 13 
14 Menzelinsk Bashkirs shared the language and culture of Bashkirs in Belebey and Birsk. The difference in their rate of assimilation can most plausibly be attributed to the difference in their political circumstances after 1922. Finding themselves in Tatarstan, Menzelinsk Bashkirs recognized the advantages of belonging to the titular nationality and quickly re-identi ed as Tatar. They were able to do so because of the extensive cultural similarities between them and Kazan Tatars. In addition, they were undoubtedl y encouraged to reidentify by the Tatarstan government's cultural and linguistic policies, which fostered Tatar education and culture at the expense of Bashkir language and culture. Similarly, Bashkirs in Belebey and Birsk were restrained from re-identifyin g by their recognition that the titular ethnic group would be privileged in Bashkortostan.
If being a member of the titular ethnic group provided cultural and political bene ts, why did a sizeable number of Bashkirs in Belebey and Birsk still re-identify as Tatars between the 1913 and 1926 Censuses? While no certain answer to this question can be given, Rodnov (1995, p. 73) proposes an interesting hypothesis. He argues that a signi cant part of the instability in ethnic self-identi cation in this region can be explained by changes in the meaning of the ethnonyms, rather than changes in individual self-identi cation. People changed their identication depending on changes in the popular perception of what an ethnonym stood for, while keeping their private identity constant. The creation of ethnic republics solidi ed the popular understanding of the Tatar and Bashkir ethnonyms, leading many individuals to re-identify as Tatar. Since local customs and dialects were more closely related to those of neighbourin g Tatarstan than to the core Bashkir area in the southeastern part of Bashkortostan, many local inhabitants changed their identity to correspond with their perception of the meaning of these ethnic labels. The change in label occurred because individuals recognized that their culture and language tted better with their perception of Tatar identity than Bashkir identity. While this hypothesis cannot be proved conclusively, it does make sense given the confusion surrounding ethnonyms in the area. Language policy. The language policies of the Bashkortostan government may also help to explain why Bashkirs re-identi ed as Tatars. These policies are also instrumental in explaining the development of a group of Bashkirs who considered Tatar to be their native language.
As mentioned above, before 1926, censuses determined ethnic identication according to a question about native language. The 1926 Census thus provides the earliest opportunity to study differences between native language and ethnic identity. Language and ethnic identity coincided for over 97 per cent of respondents from most ethnic groups and regions covered by this census. Bashkirs in Belebey and Birsk cantons were the major exception to this rule. Only 11 per cent of the Bashkirs in these areas declared Bashkir to be their native language, whereas 92 per cent of Bashkirs in the rest of the republic did so. Altogether, there were 264,000 Tatar-speaking Bashkirs in Belebey and Birsk, with another 24,000 in the rest of the republic.
This disparity was created by the language policy of the Bashkir government. In the early twentieth century, the Bashkir language was divided into three major dialects: the southern, eastern, and northwestern. Of these, the northwestern dialect was most similar to Tatar. After the formation of the Bashkir republic in 1919, local of cials and scholars began to develop a Bashkir literary language to replace the Turko-Tatar literary language that was previously used by all Muslim Turks in the Russian empire. Their purpose was to assist the consolidation of Bashkir identity by establishing a Bashkir high culture that was distinct from Tatar or Russian high culture (Bikbulatov 1992, p. 45). These scholars were divided into two groups. The rst sought to recognize the common features of the Bashkir and Tatar language by basing the Bashkir literary language on a combination of all three major Bashkir dialects. The second wanted to emphasize the uniqueness of Bashkir by distinguish ing it as much as possible from literary Tatar. The latter group won, creating a literary language which incorporated those traits shared by the eastern and southern dialects that distinguished them from the northwestern dialect (Yuldashev 1968, p. 70; Ishberdin 1989, p. 140; Kuzeev 1994, p. 121). The new literary language was introduced in 1923, quickly becoming the language of of cial business and cultural activity throughout the republic (Bikbulatov 1992, p. 45).
This context sheds considerable light on the twin puzzles of Bashkir ethnic re-identi cation and language choice. Faced with a literary language which differed signi cantly from the language that they spoke, Bashkirs in the northwest selected the literary language that most closely resembled their dialect, Tatar. Many of them chose Tatar ethnic identity as well, probably out of a sense that language and ethnicity should correspond. Others, however, chose to adopt the Tatar language but not the Tatar identity. These people may have felt a deeper sense of Bashkir ethnic identity, which allowed them to dismiss the contradiction between ethnic identi cation and native language. They may also have more clearly recognized the bene ts of being a member of the titular ethnic group. Combined, these factors allowed a signi cant percentage of the local inhabitants to identify themselves as Tatar-speaking Bashkirs. This explanation is consistent with the observed differences between Menzelinsk and the northwestern cantons of Bashkortostan. For Bashkirs in Menzelinsk, political, economic, and linguistic incentives all encouraged assimilation into the Tatar group. Bashkirs in Belebey and Birsk, on the other hand, were torn. On the one hand, their culture and language pointed towards Tatar identity. On the other hand, there were political and economic incentives to identifying as Bashkir. In this situation, almost half of the Turkic population of the region resolved this dilemma by choosing Bashkir as their ethnic identity and Tatar as their native language . * * *
We can now summarize by answering the questions presented at the beginning of this section. The predominance of Bashkir identi cation in 1897 resulted from the economic bene ts of belonging to the Bashkir estate and from the land reforms of 1865, which made changing estate easier. The revocation of land-ownership privileges for Bashkirs led to a gradual decline in Bashkir identi cation, as many non-Bashk irs returned to their previous designation . Government policies contributed to this trend in two other ways. In those parts of the area that became part of Tatarstan, bene ts for members of the titular ethnic group made reidenti cation as Tatar highly advantageou s. In addition, all speakers of the local dialect were affected by the creation of a Bashkir literary language on the basis of other dialects. This language policy, combined with the bene ts for belonging to the titular ethnic group, led many people in northwestern Bashkortostan to choose the best of both worlds by declaring Bashkir as their ethnic identity and Tatar as their language .
Second period: 1959-1989
During this period, censuses recorded two periods during which the number of Tatars declined while the number of Bashkirs grew rapidly. This was followed by one period of rapid Bashkir decline and Tatar growth which more than offset the earlier Bashkir gains. (See Tables 4  and 6 .) District-level data show that the oscillations in the republic-level data are entirely the result of events in the northwest. Areas outside of the northwest experienced a gradual decline in the Russian percentage of the population in favour of a gradual increase in either the Bashkir proportion or in both the Bashkir and Tatar percentages. The following analysis focuses exclusively on rural areas because widespread migration to the cities makes it dif cult to distinguish demographic changes due to re-identi cation from changes due to migration. Throughout this period, there was virtually no migration between rural areas. Although Tatars and Bashkirs left rural areas at similar rates, different cities served as each group's favoured destination . included Tatars switching to Bashkir identity for instrumental reasons in the 1950s or later (Korostelev 1994, p. 91) . Table 1 ). District-level data on language choice are only available for 1959 and 1989. It shows that in eighteen of the twenty-six districts where the percentage of Tatar-speaking Bashkirs declined between these years, the percentage of Tatars in the total population increased. In the remaining districts, Tatar-speaking Bashkirs either declared Bashkir to be their native language or divided evenly between Tatar and Bashkir/Bashkir identi cation. In an additional ve districts which had sizeable numbers of Tatar-speaking Bashkirs, their percentage of the Bashkir population did not decline. While the data cannot prove conclusively the direction of Tatar-speaking Bashkir identity change, they imply that about threequarters of the Tatar-speaking Bashkirs who changed their identity switched their ethnic identi cation to correspond with their Tatar language while the other one-quarter switched their native language to correspond with their Bashkir ethnic identity.
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Causes of ethnic and linguistic re-identi cation: 1959-1989
Unlike the previous period, the meaning of ethnic labels did not change during this period. People who declared different ethnic identities in different censuses were not changing their understanding of the labels' meanings -they were changing their ethnic identi cation. What caused large numbers of people to change their declared ethnic identities repeatedly over a few decades? And why did the number of Tatar-speakin g Bashkirs decline so precipitously by 1989? The answers to these questions can be found by examining government policies on the census and on native language education, as well as in the effects of Soviet institutions. Census policy and government pressure. The swings towards Bashkir identi cation in the 1959 and 1979 Censuses can be explained to a large extent by government tactics in explaining census questions, expressed as administrative pressure for respondents to identify as Bashkir. Prior to the 1959 Census, the Bashkir government conducted a propaganda campaign arguing that the census question about ethnic identity was concerned with ethnic self-identi cation, which was independent of native language. If the two did not coincide, respondents were instructed to declare their ethnic identity based on the self-identi cation (Kuzeev 1994, p. 122). This policy went against the Stalinist conception of ethnicity, which argues that an ethnic group can have but a single native language 17 (Stalin 1994, p. 19). This campaign, repeated in later censuses, was designed to prevent Tatar-speaking Bashkirs from re-identifying en masse as Tatars. Furthermore, the central government required local administrators to produce a 'quota' of Bashkirs. Results that did not achieve this quota were returned to the local administration for revision, leading one administrator to note that he was trying his best but there were no more Bashkirs to be found in his district (Khalim 1991, p. 166). Such a quota was not required in 1970, leading to a partial swing back in favour of Tatar identity according to that year's census results. Finally, on the basis of his analysis of village ethnic identi cation, Korostelev (1994, p. 78) notes that pressure by census of cials and even falsi cation at the margin were also behind the sharp swing towards Bashkir identity in the 1979 Census, although he does not provide any proof of such actions.
Administrative pressure during the census was certainly responsible for the sharp swings towards Bashkir identity in the results of the 1959 and 1979 Censuses. But it cannot explain the persistence of the Tatarspeaking Bashkir identity or the extent of the shift back to Tatar identity. To explain these phenomena, we must return to the Soviet institutional structure and also to Bashkir language policy. Institutions. Soviet institutions contributed to the trend towards Bashkir identi cation in the 1959-1979 period. The advantages of being a member of the titular ethnic group were reinforced throughout this period. Tatar writers were required to publish their books in Bashkir; members of the artistic community were told that they could only succeed if they identi ed as Bashkir painters or musicians. It was difcult for a Tatar to become a government of cial or a manager in an enterprise. 18 In this environment, not only was it irrational for Bashkirs to switch to a Tatar identity, thousands of Tatars began to list themselves as Bashkirs in of cial documents (Kulchik 1992, p. 37). The extent of this effect, even after the mass switch to Tatar identity in the 1989 Census, is shown by a survey conducted in Buraevsky district in 1990. This survey showed that 43 per cent of the population declared themselves Bashkir in of cial documents. An equal number declared themselves Tatar. In response to a question about their ethnic self-identi cation, more than half of the 'passport' Bashkirs declared that they actually perceived themselves as Tatar despite their of cial designation . Thus, 24 per cent of the population were of cially designated as Bashkir even though their self-identity was Tatar 19 (Vecherniia Ufa, 24 August 1990). How was this change accomplished in a society where people's ethnic identity seemed to be rigidly de ned on the basis of their parents' ethnicity? First of all, local administrators had a great deal of leeway in enforcing the requirement that newborns' ethnic identity corresponded to that of their parents. In a region like Bashkortostan, where the administration sought to increase the Bashkir proportion of the population, administrators at the birth registry often turned a blind eye towards cases where Tatar parents declared their baby to be of Bashkir ethnicity. 20 Furthermore, Tatars were encouraged to declare themselves Bashkirs when joining the Communist Party. Party leaders were only too glad to modify the necessary identity documents to allow such a change (Sovetskaia Bashkiria, 29 November 1989) . Despite the formal Soviet Union-wide policy that an individual 's ethnic identity match the identity of at least one of his or her parents, republic leaders created conditions where this requirement could be widely ignored by local administrators.
The creation of a sizeable group of 'passport' Bashkirs was seen as a mixed blessing by many Bashkir intellectuals. On the one hand, they desired to increase the size of their ethnic group. They found it particularly galling that they were outnumbered by Tatars on territory that they believed they 'owned'. At the same time, they saw Bashkirs from the northwest, especially those who considered Tatar their native language , as less truly Bashkir than those from the southern and eastern regions, who spoke the Bashkir literary language and whose culture was more similar to what they perceived as traditional Bashkir culture. 21 The result of this duality was a tendency for the Bashkir-controlled government to try to force or persuade people in the northwest to identify as Bashkir during the census campaign, followed by an equally strong tendency to enact policies that favoured areas where 'real' Bashkirs lived (Kuzeev 1990, p. 41 ). This dual policy had the effect of increasing the amount of revenue that could be directed towards Bashkir needs by in ating the total number of Bashkirs, while at the same time restricting the sphere of legitimate recipients of this largesse, cutting out 'fake' Bashkirs and leaving more for the 'real' Bashkirs who controlled the government. I call supporters of this policy, who controlled government ethnic policy until the 1970s, the 'self-consciousness' faction. Language policy and 1989. The dual track policy described in the previous section produced the desired results for several decades. It failed in 1989 because of a combination of factors. First, democratization and the Gorbachev reforms, which emphasized individual merit, made ethnically-based privileges morally suspect -many such privileges were eliminated. Without privileges, many Tatars who had changed their identity to Bashkir for instrumental reasons switched back to their previous Tatar identity. Second, democratization also made government pressure and campaigns to persuade Tatars to declare themselves Bashkir more dif cult. This led many Tatars who had identi ed as Bashkir because of pressure from local administrators or census workers to return to their previous ethnic identi cation (Iskhakov 1993, p. 36 ). Both of these groups were people who had never truly changed their ethnic identity, merely changing their public ethnic label.
Finally, many people who considered themselves ethnically Bashkir but who spoke the Tatar language were persuaded to switch because of Bashkir education policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the late 1970s, those Bashkir leaders who advocated the 'one nation -one language' conception of Bashkir identity took control of the education ministry and other cultural policy-making government bodies from the previously dominant 'self-consciousness' faction, which had pursued the policy of maximizing Bashkir numbers described above. The onelanguage faction used their control over ethnic policy to remove Tatar from the list of the republic's of cial languages in the 1978 constitution (Khalim 1991, p. 171). Following this constitutional change, the government sought to institute the 'one nation -one language ' policy by switching schools in Tatar-speaking Bashkir villages to Bashkir language instruction. This policy was fostered by the belief that Bashkirs in this area were former Bashkir-speakers who had been assimilated into the Tatar cultural and linguistic milieu. Bashkir leaders justi ed the policy by arguing that Bashkirs had an obligation to be uent in their 'native' language and that the best way to achieve this uency was through Bashkirlanguage education in the schools. 22 The Bashkir language that was used in this instruction was the literary language that was entirely foreign to northwestern Bashkirs (Kuzeev 1994, p. 122). As a result, the number of students receiving Tatar language instruction decreased from 110,000 to 21,000 between 1978 and 1987 (Khalim 1991, p. 175).
The introduction of Bashkir-language schooling fomented widespread resistance among the inhabitants of the region. While a minority of the Tatar-speaking Bashkirs accepted the 'one language -one nation' policy, changing their native language to correspond with their ethnic identication, the vast majority refused to accept Bashkir as their native language and began to re-identify as Tatar. 23 Prior to the Bashkirization of the schools, local Tatar-speaking Bashkirs had arrived at a modus vivendi with the Bashkir state. Since the 1920s they considered themselves to be ethnically Bashkir, while speaking the Tatar language and subscribing to much of Tatar culture. This situation was made possible by the lack of impact of Bashkir public identity on private life.
Locals who spoke Tatar but considered themselves ethnically Bashkir gained the advantages of a titular ethnic identity while preserving the freedom to speak Tatar and follow Tatar cultural practices at home. Bashkirization of the schools sought to force local inhabitants to make their cultural and linguistic identities coincide with their public ethnic identities, thus violating the implicit compact. Local Tatar-speakin g Bashkirs responded with a mass campaign to restore Tatar education. This resistance was spearheaded by the schoolteachers, who made up a signi cant part of the rural intelligentsi a and played a key role in moulding local ethnic identity (Korostelev 1994, p. 82) . The campaign was eventually successful, but only after the removal of the Bashkir Communist Party chief by Gorbachev in 1987.
The abortive Bashkirization campaign had a powerful effect on ethnic identi cation in the 1989 Census. By attempting to force Tatar-speakin g Bashkirs to switch to the Bashkir language, the government signi cantly increased the cost of maintaining Bashkir ethnic identity for non-Bashkir speakers. Tatar-speaking Bashkirs knew that Bashkirization had occurred only in Bashkir villages. Neighbouring Tatar villages kept their Tatar schools. In this context, many Tatar-speaking Bashkirs came to believe that only by changing their ethnic identity to match their linguistic identity could they be safe from future linguistic Bashkirization campaigns.
It is important to note that available statistical data cannot prove that the identity change that occurred among Tatar-speaking Bashkirs in the 1980s was substantively different from previous instances of purely public identity change. I have reached this conclusion on the basis of interviews and other non-quantitative data. For example, Marat Ramazanov, one of the leaders of the Tatar nationalist movement, described himself as a Tatar-speaker of Bashkir ethnicity who re-identied as a Tatar and joined the Tatar nationalist movement because Bashkirs insisted that he change his language while Tatars were willing to accept him as he was. 24 This sort of claim is substantively different from the argument made by some Tatars in earlier periods who noted that they always considered themselves Tatar despite their identity documents, which showed them to be Bashkir (Khalim 1990, p. 7). Based on this difference, we can hypothesize that two separate processes of identity change, one public and one private, were occurring simultaneously in northwestern Bashkortostan in the 1980s.
Statistical proof for this claim may come from the coming 1999 Census. With the restoration of pro-Bashkir favouritism in the 1990s, we should expect a return to Tatar-speaking Bashkir identity if the shift away from it in the 1980s was simply a reaction to the end of incentives for Bashkir identi cation by people who always considered themselves Tatar. If, on the other hand, Tatar-speakin g Bashkir identity continues to decline despite the re-emergence of previously existing incentives to identify as Bashkir, this will show that the 1980s saw a change in private ethnic identi cation that cannot be reversed simply through a return to the old incentives structure. * * *
We have seen from census data that a signi cant number of Bashkirs re-identi ed as Tatars between the 1979 and 1989 Censuses. Many of these people had not actually changed their ethnic identity, having previously switched ethnic labels for instrumental reasons. Their re-identication was similar to the mass re-identi cation from Bashkir to Tatar identity that occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century.
What made the 1989 identity change different from previous mass changes of identity in this area was the presence of a second group of people, comprised primarily of Tatar-speaking Bashkirs, who actually changed their personal identity, rather than merely taking on a different public identity that would improve their economic or political status. Unlike the rst group, these people had never previously considered themselves Tatar, having maintained Bashkir as their ethnic identity continuously since before the communist revolution. By attempting to make individuals ' linguistic identities match their ethnic identities, Bashkir leaders raised the costs of maintaining the ethnic identity for these people to unacceptable levels. This change, especially in combination with a decline in the economic and political bene ts of Bashkir ethnic identity, led over 100,000 Tatar-speakin g Bashkirs to change their ethnic identity from Bashkir to Tatar. By trying to force linguistic identity to match ethnic identity, Bashkir leaders unwittingly brought about the opposite outcome, wherein local inhabitants changed their ethnic identity to match their linguistic identity. Such an identity change was possible partially because the cultural distance between Tatar and Bashkir ethnic identities was small. It was also possible because local inhabitants had become used to neighbours changing their public ethnic identity in order to ful l government targets for ethnic distribution or to maximize their utility. Throughou t the twentieth century many inhabitants of northwestern Bashkortostan frequently changed their ethnic label without actually changing their behaviour or social interactions in any way. However, the frequency of this change in label made ethnic identity as a whole seem more mutable even for those who did not change their public identity, making it signi cantly easier for them to change their ethnic identity when conditions warranted.
Conclusions
Throughout the twentieth century, changes in ethnic identity in northwestern Bashkortostan followed changes in state policies towards ethnic groups. Before the 1917 revolution the elimination of estate-based restrictions on land-ownership led many Tatars and Mishars who had identi ed as Bashkirs in order to gain the right to own land to return to their previous identities. In the 1920s the establishment of ethnic republics which were allowed to favour titular ethnic groups led many Bashkirs who found themselves in Tatarstan after the division of Ufa province to re-identify as Tatars. At the same time, government policies on the creation of a Bashkir literary language led many Bashkirs to declare Tatar as their native language. Throughout the post-war period, preferences for members of the titular ethnic group led many Tatars in Bashkortostan to declare themselves Bashkir in of cial documents. The end of such privileges in the mid-1980s led many of these individuals to reclaim the Tatar identity in the 1989 Census. Finally, the forced conversion of Tatar-language schools in Bashkir villages to literary Bashkir persuaded many Tatar-speaking Bashkirs to re-identify as Tatars in order to allow their children to attend Tatar-language schools. The instability of ethnic identity in this region is thus the result of multiple changes in government policy towards minority ethnic groups.
These ethnic identity shifts demonstrate the crucial role of the state in provoking ethnic change. In fact, changes in state policy and the creation of new state institutions are the link between accounts of ethnic change that focus on identity change for instrumental reasons and accounts of ethnic change that focus on changes in the cultural content of ethnic identity. Government action can modify the cost-bene t calculus that leads to identity shift for instrumental reasons by introducing new policies that bene t or penalize the members of a particular group. The state can also channel the cultural content of ethnic identity in new directions by such actions as the creation of a new literary language or the merging of several ethnic groups into a new, compound identity. By focusing on the immediate causes of ethnic identity change, much of the theoretical literature has missed the role of state action as the crucial precursor to such change.
1.
Banks (1996) provides a helpful summary and analysis of these and other debates among anthropologists who study ethnicity. I am indebted to this journal's anonymous reviewer for this reference.
2. The data on Bashkir and Tatar identity are drawn primarily from Russian and Soviet censuses. The Russian empire conducted a full census in 1897 and a rural census in 1913. The Soviet government conducted censuses in 1920, 1926, 1939, 1959, 1970, 1979 , and
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